标签归档:考研

又是80后

最近以来,似乎涉及到80后的东西都成了热门。就不说那个某80后作家与80岁作家的口水战了,在论坛里、社区里各种80后的帖子和群组总是人满为患。真不知道是诸多80前的“长辈们”对于自己逐渐老去而进行的自卫还是80后自己的刻意炒作。

要是从80年出生算起的话,这80年代初期出生的一群人已逐渐成为公司的新生代,有的在部分职位上也开始了逐渐掌权,有的逐渐也开始结婚生子。只是这一代人的童年没有轰轰烈烈的干过“革命”,而是成长在“改革开放初期”并开始滋长了“资产阶级自由化”的思想的80年代,那个年代也是文学的高潮期,因此这一代人还保存着对诗词歌赋的些许兴趣,但却在90年代进一步“搞活”的时代开始了“资产阶级的腐朽生活”,还没等碰上国家的“金饭碗”,却遭遇了有史以来教育的产业化进程——高校扩招。当毕业时分才发现遍地的大学生早已使“逃课”混来的文凭不再值钱,于是出国、考研成了热潮,也催生养育了一批下海为商的“知识分子中介”,象各地的考研培训、留学中介等(新东方便依此而开始“挣美国股民的钱了”),当然大批的就业者更让职业中介暴富,同时还有求职网站。更多的还是这批80后在享受不到父辈的国家福利房时,也把中国的房价提高到了空前水平。

这些事件,虽然不全是80后所为,但也足以让80后备受关注。

这是一个没有安全感的一代,一个被改革开放的经济大潮推向市场的一代,一个不再相信传统(如果有的话)只相信自我的一代,一个宁愿过犬儒生活也不去问政治的一代。

同济大学07年哲学系研究生复试英语试题

翻译是选自罗素的《哲学问题》的第十五章——“哲学的价值”,英文如下:

what is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It is the more necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.

This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of goods which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science, through the medium of inventions, is useful to innumerable people who are wholly ignorant of it; thus the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. Thus utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it. It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of philosophy must be primarily sought.

But further, if we are not to fail in our endeavour to determine the value of philosophy, we must first free our minds from the prejudices of what are wrongly called’practical’ men. The’practical’ man, as this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a waste of time.

Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton’s great work was called’the mathematical principles of natural philosophy’. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.

This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of philosophy. There are many questions — and among them those that are of the profoundest interest to our spiritual life — which, so far as we can see, must remain insoluble to the human intellect unless its powers become of quite a different order from what they are now. Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by various philosophers. But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or not, the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge.

Many philosophers, it is true, have held that philosophy could establish the truth of certain answers to such fundamental questions. They have supposed that what is of most importance in religious beliefs could be proved by strict demonstration to be true. In order to judge of such attempts, it is necessary to take a survey of human knowledge, and to form an opinion as to its methods and its limitations. On such a subject it would be unwise to pronounce dogmatically; but if the investigations of our previous chapters have not led us astray, we shall be compelled to renounce the hope of finding philosophical proofs of religious beliefs. We cannot, therefore, include as part of the value of philosophy any definite set of answers to such questions. Hence, once more, the value of philosophy must not depend upon any supposed body of definitely ascertainable knowledge to be acquired by those who study it.

The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.

译文如下:

哲学的价值是什么?为什么应当研究哲学?在科学和实际事务的影响之下,许多人都倾向于怀疑:比起不关利害又毫无足取的辨析毫芒,比起在知识所不能达到的问题上进行论战,哲学比起它们来又能强多少?所以,现在就更需要考虑这个问题了。

对于哲学所以出现了这种看法,一部分是由于在人生的目的上有一种错误的看法,一部分也由于对哲学所争取达到的东西没有一个正确的概念。现在,物理科学
上的发明创造使无数不认识这门学问的人已经认为物理科学是有用的东西了;因此,现在所以要推荐研究物理科学,与其说根本原因在于它对学生的影响,不如说在于它对整个人类的影响。这种实用性是哲学所没有的。除了对于哲学学者之外,如果研究哲学对别人也有价值的话,那也必然只是通过对于学习哲学的人的生活所起的影响而间接地在发生作用。因此,哲学的价值根本就必须求之于这些影响。

但是,更进一步说,倘使我们想要使评定哲学的价值的企图不致失败,那么我们首先必须在思想上摆脱掉“现实”的人的偏见。“现实”的人,照这个词的通常用法,是指只承认物质需要的人,只晓得人体需要食粮,却忽略了为心灵提供食粮的必要性。即使人人都是经济充裕的,即使贫困和疾病已经减少到不能再小的程度,为了创造一个有价值的社会,还是会有很多事情要做的;即使是在目前的社会之中,心灵所需要的东西至少也是和肉体所需要的东西同样重要。只有在心灵的食粮中才能够找到哲学的价值;也只有不漠视心灵食粮的人,才相信研究哲学并不是白白浪费时间。

哲学和别的学科一样,其目的首先是要获得知识。哲学所追求的是可以提供一套科学统一体系的知识,和由于批判我们的成见、偏见和信仰的基础而得来的知识。但是我们却不能够认为它对于它的问题提供确定的答案时,会有极高度的成就。倘使你问一位数学家、一位矿物学家、一位历史学家或者任何一门的博学之士,在他那门科学里所肯定的一套真理是什么,他的答案会长得让你听得厌烦为止。但是,倘使你把这个问题拿来问一位哲学家的话,如果他的态度是坦率的,他一定承认他的研究还没有能获得像别种科学所达到的那样肯定的结果。当然,下述的事实可以部分地说明这种情况:任何一门科学,只要关于它的知识一旦可能确定,这门科学便不再称为哲学,而变成为一门独立的科学了。关于天体的全部研究现在属于天文学,但是过去曾包含在哲学之内;牛顿的伟大著作就叫作《自然哲学之数学原理》。同样,研究人类心理的学问,直到晚近为止还是哲学的一部分,但是现在已经脱离哲学而变成为心理学。因此,哲学的不确定性在很大程度上不但是真实的,而且还是明显的:有了确定答案的问题,都已经放到各种科学里面去了;而现在还提不出确定答案的问题,便仍构成为叫作哲学的这门学问的残存部分。

然而,关于哲学的不确定性,这一点还只是部分的真理。有许多问题——其中那些和我们心灵生活最有深切关系的——就我们所知,乃是人类才智所始终不能解决的,除非人类的才智变得和现在完全不同了。宇宙是否有一个统一的计划或目的呢?抑或宇宙仅仅是许多原子的一种偶然的集合呢?意识是不是宇宙中的一个永恒不变的部分,它使得智慧有着无限扩充的希望呢?抑或它只是一颗小行星上一桩昙花一现的偶然事件,在这颗行星上,最后连生命也要归于消灭呢?善和恶对于宇宙是否重要呢?或者它们只有对于人类才是重要的呢?这些问题都是哲学所设问的,不同的哲学家有不同的答案。但是,木论答案是否可以用别的方法找出来,看来哲学所提出来的答案并不是可以用实验来证明其真确性的。然而,不论找出一个答案的希望是如何地微乎其微,哲学的一部分责任就是要继续研究这类问题,使我们觉察到它们的重要性,研究解决它们的门径,并保持对于宇宙的思考兴趣,使之蓬勃不衰,而如果我们局限于可明确地肯定的知识范围之内,这种兴趣是很易被扼杀的。

不错,许多哲学家都曾抱有这种见解,认为对于上述那些基本问题的某些答案,哲学可以确定它们的真假。他们认为宗教信仰中最重要的部分是可以用严谨的验证证明其为真确的。要判断这些想法,就必须通盘考虑一下人类的知识,对于它的方法和范围就必须形成一种见解。对于这样一个问题,独断是不明智的;但是前几章的研究如果没有把我们引入歧途的话,我们便不得不放弃为宗教信仰寻找哲学证据的希望了。因此,对于这些问题的任何一套确定的答案,我们都不能容纳其成为哲学的价值的一部分。因此,我们要再一次说明,哲学的价值必然不在于哲学研究者可以获得任何一套可明确肯定的知识的假设体系。

事实上,哲学的价值大部分须在它的极其不确定性之中去追求。没有哲学色彩的人一生总免不了受束缚于种种偏见,由常识、由他那个时代或民族的习见、由末经深思熟虑而滋长的自信等等所形成的偏见。对于这样的人,世界是固定的、有穷的、一目了然的;普通的客体引不起他的疑问,可能发生的未知事物他会傲慢地否定。但是反之,正如在开头几章中我们所已明了的,只要我们一开始采取哲学的态度,我们就会发觉,连最平常的事情也有问题,而我们能提供的答案又只能是极不完善的。哲学虽然对于所提出的疑问,不能肯定告诉我们哪个答案对,但却能扩展我们的思想境界,使我们摆脱习俗的控制。因此,哲学虽然对于例如事物是什么这个问题减轻了我们可以肯定的感觉,但却大大增长了我们对于事物可能是什么这个问题的知识。它把从未进入过自由怀疑的境地的人们的狂妄独断的说法排除掉了,并且指出所熟悉的事物中那不熟悉的一面,使我们的好奇感永远保持着敏锐状态。

2007年同济美学考研试题与分析

一年又一年,终于考完了。虽然对每个问题都答的满满的,但心里总有些不塌实。

西方美学史

一 名词解释(共四个,每题10分)

迷狂 《论崇高》 诗性思维(维柯) 原欲升华

二 简答题(每题20分)

1.柏拉图为什么说艺术与诗“和真理隔着三层”?

2.康德如何论述“审美无利害”的观点的?

3.简述黑格尔“美是理念的感性显现”

三 论述题(二选一,50分)

1.海德格尔(忘记具体是什么)

2.举例论述20世纪艺术对美学原则的背叛。

分析:比起去年的题,减弱了偏重文学理论的倾向,考了德国古典哲学的两个最主要人物,特别是康德的题出的很细。考纲中并没有说有名词解释的题型,虽然去年有这样的题。

西方艺术史

一 名词解释(每题10分)

米开朗琪罗 巴洛克 德拉克洛瓦 哥特式风格 毕加索 达达主义

二 简答题(每题20分)

1.为什么会出现抽象主义?

2.简述哥雅的艺术特色

三 论述题(二选一 50分)

1.分析城市涂鸦艺术

2.从达芬奇的《蒙娜丽莎》中分析其文化密码

分析:考纲中没有要求名词解释,却出现了,而且一气出了六个,三个人物,三种风格,可以说都是有代表性的。简答题出的莫名其妙,甚至有些出奇不意。论述很结合现实,可以说我已经大致想过第二题会出现。

总之,题是答完了,希望老师给个好成绩了。

06年同济大学美学考研试题与分析

哎,终于考完了。很累人,现根据回忆将两门专业课的试题整理如下,并附上个人见解。给来年的考生个参考,因为同济这个专业没有题卖的。

西方美学史

一、名词解释(每题10分)

1.净化2.三一律3.“内在的感官” 4.酒神精神

二、简答(每题20分)

1.柏拉图在理想国中为何要将诗人驱逐出去?

2.简述黑格尔的悲剧理论。

3.举例分析崇高美

三、论述题(二选一50分)

1.对于中国当代的文艺现象,谈谈你的看法。

2.举例论述现代主义和后现代主义文艺的美学特征。

个人看法:

我看到同济的考试大纲以及专业划分,而且把美学专业放在哲学系里,就以为会偏重于艺术哲学,但是从考题来看比较偏重于文学美学,弄得我还以为在考文学系呢。而且大纲上也根本没说要考当代美学的知识,我以为放在复试里会问,严重超纲50分呢。

西方艺术史

一、简答(每题20分)

1.希腊神庙建筑的特征

2.罗马式建筑的特征

3.伦博朗肖像画的艺术特征

4.拉非尔的艺术成就

5.法国印象主义的特征

6.立体主义的特征

二、论述(四选三,每题30分)

1.分析尼采对希腊悲剧时代造型艺术的论述。

2.文艺复兴时期意大利绘画取得的成就和特征。

3.论述法国古典主义和新古典主义。

4.德国表现主义在现代艺术史上的地位。

艺术史我就不说什么了,超纲30分。